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FORASW 
BY CAPTAIN WALKER MILLS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, 
AND LIEUTENANT COMMANDERS COLLIN FOX, DYLAN 
PHILIPS-LEVINE, AND TREVOR PHILIPS-LEVINE, U.S. NAVY 
C 
hainnan Mao did not include the maxim "train like you 
fight" in his little red book, but the People's Liberation 
Anny Navy (PLAN) submarine force clearly under­
stands it well enough. Its simulated cruise missile at­
tack on the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) in 2015 re­
vealed how much Chinese capabilities and ambitions had grown 
since 2006, when a Song-class diesel-electric submarine sur­
faced within torpedo range of the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). 1 
Long-range, antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) launched from a 
growing fleet of diesel submarines represent the pacing tactical 
threat for naval surface forces. The carrier strike group needs 
more and better antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platforms to de­
fend against these increasingly potent weapons and defeat their 
stealthy launch platforms from standoff ranges. Fortunately, a 
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The Navy needs new and innovative antisubmarine warfare platforms 
to defend against China's stealthy and potent long-range threat. 
According to a Department of Defense report, several Chinese submarine classes, including the Shang class (pictured), 
wlll be outfitted with China's new long-range antlshlp cruise missile, meaning the United States needs to up Its long-
range antisubmarine warfare game. 
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variety of existing and emerging technologies can help 
distribute more sensors and more weapons on more plat-
forms and catalyze novel operational concepts. 
THE THREAT 
In 2005, China bought eight Kilo-class submarines 
equipped with the SS-N-27 "Sizzler" ASCM, which boasts 
a 120-nautical mile (nm) range with a sea-skimming cruise 
followed by a terminal supersonic sprint. At the time, these 
missiles represented the worst-case submarine threat to 
carrier strike groups or surface action groups.2 
The Chinese submarine force has since gained even 
more powerful weapons, while also growing in size and 
proficiency. The Department of Defense's annual re-
port on Chinese military capabilities noted that China's 
"Song-class SS [ 13 hulls), Yuan-class SSP [ 17 hulls and 
counting], and Shang-class SSN (6 hulls] will field the 
The Office of Naval Research photoacoustic airborne sonar systems 
(PASS) are low-flying drones that use lasers to vaporize water nea, 
the surface to generate underwater sound, which propagates like a 
sonar ping. 
PLAN's newest domestic submarine-launched Y J-18 and 
its variants, which constitute an improvement over the 
SS-N-27 ASCM. [ .. . ) The YJ-18 is a long-range, tor-
pedo-tube-launched ASCM with a supersonic terminal 
sprint. "3 China already has more than 40 submarines ca-
pable of firing long-range and supersonic ASCMs, with 
new shipyards churning out more hulls at a worrying 
pace.4 Coupled with effective reconnaissance and over-
the-horizon targeting, a few of these submarines could 
devastate a strike group almost anywhere in the theater 
with a massed, multiaxis attack. 
STATUS QUO FALLS SHORT 
The emergence of Chinese submarine-launched antiship 
cruise missiles with third-party cuing means the subma-
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rine threat extends far beyond the reach of organic car-
rier-based helicopter ASW screens, which are fulfilling 
a mission to mitigate the threat of submarine-launched 
torpedoes. The MH-60R simply lacks the range, speed, 
and payload to conduct extensive searches at the ranges 
needed to protect the group from submarine-launched 
ASCMs. 
The basic logic of distributed maritime operations ap-
plies to this increasingly difficult ASW problem: dis-
tribute more sensors and more weapons on more plat-
forms, with better integration, to counter a greater threat. 
Though tactical ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines 
get more press, this potent threat must be countered if the 
Navy is to retain a credible conventional deterrent in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
LONG-RANGE DETECTION AND SPEED OF ATTACK 
"Awfully Slow Warfare" describes how ASW often feels 
to those searching for a submarine over days or even 
weeks, but the relative time scale shrinks abruptly with an 
inbound missile. Defending against threat missiles such 
as the Y J-18, with an estimated range of 120-290 nautical 
miles, requires sensors to detect them at launch and ASW 
weapons to quickly counterattack the emergent targets.5 
If targeted ships can only detect incoming ASCMs as 
they crest the radar horizon going Mach 3 and there is no 
datum (submarine location at lost contact), the threat sub-
marine can continue firing salvo after salvo of these long-
range weapons with near impunity. Fortunately, artifi-
cial intelligence (Al) can help integrate existing strategic 
and tactical sensors. Connecting these potentially stove-
piped systems could give maritime forces near-instant 
alert of missile launches, including submarine-launched 
ASCMs, allowing these forces to both prepare their mis-
sile defenses and prosecute the hostile submarine with a 
vengeance. 
The space-based infrared system (SBIRS) detected Ira-
nian tactical ballistic missile launches and gave soldiers 
at the targeted base in Iraq time to seek cover.6 The sys-
tem likewise could detect the launch plume of an ASCM 
missile booster. Airborne systems such as the F-35's AN/ 
AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) and the 
F/A-18FJF Block III's infrared search-and-track system 
(IRST) pod could even detect launches beneath cloud 
cover. However, these sensors lack timely integration. 
The Missile Defense Agency has long invested in Al to 
recognize ballistic missile launches and rapidly fuse data 
from several sensors, and similar techniques could inte-
grate sensors against smaller ASCMs.1 After SBIRS or 
DAS/IRST-equipped aircraft detected a possible booster 
plume, this AI-fueled tactical decision aid could filter the 
location against known air and surface contacts, slew 
other sensors to search for the missiles and launch plat-
form, assess the probability of a submarine launch, es• 
tablish an ASW datum if relevant, and vector ASW air-
craft- all in a matter of seconds. 
LONG·RANGE SOLUTIONS FOR LONG-RANGE 
PROBLEMS 
Detecting a missile plume more than 200 miles away 
does little good for submarine prosecution if the only or-
ganic ASW asset is an MH-60R, because it would take 
more than an hour for it to arrive at the launch point-
where the submarine undoubtedly no longer would be. To 
credibly defend a carrier strike group againstASCMs, the 
Navy needs platforms that can get there quickly enough 
to threaten a submarine. 
Just as the F/A-180 took over the EA-6B's mission 
with half the crew, a section ofF/A-18Fs or F-35s config-
ured for ASW could assume the role of the retired S-3 Vi-
king and bring organic, fast, and long-range ASW back to 
the carrier air wing. An airborne ASW patrol could help 
pinpoint the target location with IRST, defeat inbound 
missiles with its own air-to-air missiles, and quickly 
reach the target area to both conduct an urgent attack and 
then deploy a range of sensors for follow-on prosecution. 
Rather than simply reinventing the S-3B on a new air-
frame, the Navy should use F/A-18s and F-35s to lever-
age smarter sensors, unmanned technology (including 
MQ-25s as wingmen), and novel weapons to track and 
attack distant submarines. However, because they lack 
the S-3 's long loiter time, they would need a new toolkit 
of persistent, mobile sensors and over-the-horizon relays 
to enable a new operational concept. 
NEW PAYLOADS IN FAMILIAR PACKAGES 
Recognizing the renewed importance of ASW, industry 
has started fitting sonobuoy pods to a variety of unmanned 
platforms, including MQ-4C Tritons, MQ-8C Fire Scouts, 
and MQ-9 Reapers. F-35 Lightnings, F/A-18 Super Hor-
The F/A·18's Infrared search-and-track system could be used 
to detect missile launches even beneath cloud cover. F/A-18s, 
F·35s, and even MQ-25s could also carry more advanced, mobile, 
sonobuoy-form payloads that could autonomously detect, track, 
and trail target submarines for hours. 
nets, and MQ-25 Stingrays also should cany pods such as 
the L3 Harris Sonobuoy Dispenser System (SOS), but it 
is equally important that they carry sonobuoy-form pay-
loads far more capable than the existing inventory. Ex-
isting sonobuoys do not move w~th the target, and envi-
ronmental conditions rarely support a probable detection 
range of more than a few thousand yards. Consequently, 
legacy airborne ASW platforms must continually lay 
sonobuoys in front of evasive submarines to generate a 
deliberate attack solution. Mobile sonobuoy-form pay-
loads, on the other hand, could autonomously detect, 
track, and trail target submarines for hours. 
Stanford University researchers working for the Of-
fice of Naval Research recently conducted a lab demon-
stration using a sonobuoy-form unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) to track a submerged submarine without getting 
wet.• Dubbed the photoacoustic airborne sonar system 
(PASS), these low-flying drones use lasers to vaporize 
water near the surface to generate underwater sound, 
which propagates like any other sonar ping. The UAV 
also carries an array of capacitive micro-machined ul-
trasound transducers (CMUT), which are sensitive 
enough to detect sonar returns across the water-air bar-
rier. Swarms of these airborne sonar sensors could coop-
eratively search the area and then track any detected sub-
marines. Adding a magnetic anomaly detector to these 
UAVs could further corroborate a detected object as a 
submarine and not, for example, a whale. 
Tactical environmental conditions with a strong ther-
mal layer could trap these sounds in the surface or mixed 
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A multistatlc system-of-systems could further Improve search 
and locallzatlon of threat submarines. The P·SA Poseidon already 
employs this capablllty with specialized SSQ-125 sonobuoys and 
open-architecture sonar-processing suite. 
layer sound channel and prevent them from ever reach-
ing a deeper target. This acoustic reality applies to any 
surface-based sonar, however, not just PASS. Getting 
a mobile sensor beneath the layer would complement 
these PASS UAVs and give the target submarine no-
where to hide. 
Like a much smaller, slower, and cheaper torpedo, 
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) deployed from 
sonobuoy tubes could help see beneath this acoustic 
layer. The Mk-39 Expendable Mobile Anti-Submarine 
Training Target (EMATT) has served as an affordable 
target for decades. Mating parts of this proven system 
with a low-cost active sonar system, perhaps using a 
CMUT array, would give ASW crews a mobile and au-
tonomous acoustic sensor. Changes in the sensor's so-
nar emissions, such as changes in the chirp profile or 
pulse repetition frequency, would alert other sensors 
and listening aircrew that the UUV had found some-
thing worth chasing. 
Finally, an air-launched, medium-altitude UAV would 
allow fuel-limited jets to depart distant targets after de-= 
ploying their weapons and sensors. These loitering drones 
would receive, bundle, and retransmit signals from the 
mix of airborne PASS UAVs and sonobuoys back to the 
carrier strike group, allowing ASW crews to continue 
tracking the target during gaps in manned aircraft cov-
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erage. Though such an air-launched UAV could launch 
from a sonobuoy tube, a larger UAV deployed from a 
bomb rack would allow longer loiter time. This overhead 
relay would also help tie distributed acoustic sensors into 
a novel multistatic sonar system. 
TAKING MULTISTATIC SENSORS TO THE EDGE 
Like most acoustic ASW systems today, both the PASS 
UAV and the EMATT-based UUV use bistatic sonar, with 
a collocated transmitter and receiver. While these tools 
would help the distant ASW fight, the Navy also should 
tie many other individual acoustic sensors, both new and 
old, into a multistatic sonar system-of-systems architec-
ture to further improve search and localization. Unlike a 
bistatic sensor with a single transducer, any receiver in a 
multistatic system can process the echoes generated by 
any transmitter in the network, and by comparing return 
signals, the system can generate a target track. Serbian 
forces asserted that they employed multistatic radar to de-
tect and shoot down an F-117 Nighthawk in 1999, and 
the P-8A Poseidon already employs the multistatic active 
coherent capability with specialized SSQ-125 sonobuoys 
and a powerful, open-architecture sonar processing suite.9 
Continuing advances in computing efficiency and 
power facilitate edge processing, that is, processing most 
data at the device, rather than at a central server such as 
the one on board the P-8A. This basic systems architec-
ture underlies the Internet of Things and 5G, but it could 
also unlock the widespread use of inter-platform multi-
static sonar. 
A cycle for this edge-processed multistatic sonar 
would start with a network "standby" message, pre-an-
nouncing the location, depth, acoustic profile, and time 
of a pending chirp. Distributed acoustic sensors within 
the network would then listen-first for the transmitted 
sound and then for any echoes. Each networked sensor, 
be it a passive sonobuoy, an active sonobuoy, unmanned 
surface vessel, or something else, would process these 
sonar returns locally and then broadcast its calculated tar-
get location along with the strength, direction, and Dop-
pler shift of the return. This edge-processed multistatic 
sonar network would create a more complete acoustic 
picture, accelerating the localization and neutralization 
of threat submarines. 
The edge-processing model also would enable sensors 
to listen passively for frequencies of interest and only 
transmit an alert message on hearing them. Although less 
useful than multistatic active sonar against a nearly silent 
diesel submarine drifting along on batteries, passive de-
tection remains relevant for noisier nuclear submarines. 
The edge-processing model also would help preserve 
sensor battery life for both active and passive sonobuoys 
by reducing radio and sonar transmissions. Alternatively, 
shrinking the battery would allow each launching plat-
fonn to carry more sonobuoys while still maintaining ac-
ceptable buoy life. However implemented, payloads and 
not the platform will dictate future ASW. 
ATTACK! (DON'T TRACK) 
F/A-18s, F-35s, and MQ-25s need weapons to quickly 
engage threat submarines with an urgent attack and 
follow-up with deliberate attacks as needed. For the 
near tenn, the Navy should flight test the existing Mk-
54 lightweight torpedo for these aircraft, ideally with 
the High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabil-
ity (HAAWC) guided wing kit. The same applies to the 
Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW), which weighs 
little more than an AIM-9X and could give these aircraft 
a capable ASW weapon for routine carriage. 
These existing torpedoes have a major limitation: 
quantity. The Navy's stockpile of lightweight torpe-
does is limited, as is shipboard magazine space for these 
highly volatile, chemically fueled weapons. 
The Navy could create an affordable and nearly un-
limited antisubmarine smart weapon by transforming the 
humble depth charge. Following the basic configuration 
ofQuickstrike air-dropped mines, this novel depth charge 
would use any Mk-80 series bomb, a high-drag ballute 
tail unit, and an underwater proximity fuse installed in 
the rear fuse well. Capacitive micromachined ultrasound 
transducers, which also enable the PASS technology, 
would allow a low-cost, highly reliable sonar sensor.10 
Water impact would shear off the tail unit, after which 
the fuse would deploy a drogue-stabilized omnidirec-
tional sonar transducer as it fell through the water. The 
depth charge would detonate just past the closest point of 
approach with the target submarine to maximize damage. 
The aircraft carrier's magazine could store thousands of 
such fuses, ready to transform any Mk-80 series bomb 
into an instant ASW weapon. 
TAG AND RELEASE 
Finally, although the Navy needs more and better ASW 
weapons to attack threat submarines, it also needs better 
antisubmarine tools to manage conflict escalation short of 
armed conflict. During the Cold War, NATO ASW forces 
experimented with magnetic noise makers that were 
dropped in bulk on Soviet submarines, and used practice 
depth charges to warn off Soviet submarines during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.11 
Updating the magnetic noisemakers into low-cost and 
expendable command-activated acoustic beacons could 
help avoid such dangerous confusion during a future cri-
sis, while also providing a tactical advantage if that crisis 
tipped into war. These could be deployed from repurposed 
Rockeye cluster munition dispensers, sonobuoy-shaped 
dispensers, or with more precision by UUVs such as the 
one proposed above. 
No single emerging technology or novel tactic can 
solve the challenge of long-range, submarine-launched 
antiship cruise missiles. ASW platforms will have to not 
only detect launches but also get to them in time to pros-
ecute them. The speed and range of fixed-wing, carri-
er-based aircraft equipped with sonobuoy launchers, mo-
bile sensors, and advanced ASW weapons could help 
recover much of the S-3 Viking's capability. Weaving a 
variety of these emerging tools and techniques into new 
operational concepts can do that and more. 
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